


The Many Facets of Love
Philosophical Explorations

Edited by

Thomas Jay Oord



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To all who explore the many facets of love...

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

METAPHYSICS OF THE PERSON:
LOVE AS FOUNDATION AND FULFILLMENT

BY MARIA FEDORYKA

"Man that is born of a woman is of few days...He comes forth like a flower, and withers; he flees like a shadow, and continues not." (Job 14:1-2) In this way, the author of the book containing perhaps the most pessimistic and one could almost even say nihilistic passages of Scripture—reflects on the radical contingency of the human person. On the other hand, with an eloquence conveying a solemn authority unparalleled by any other literature, Scripture also contains declarations of the security of man's being in an all-powerful God—as in Psalm 59: "But I shall sing of your strength, extol your love at dawn, For you are my fortress...My strength, your praise I will sing; you, God, are my fortress, my loving God." (17-18) Is this connection between the confidence of the Psalmist and God's love an accidental or sentimental overflow of an eager poet? I suggest that it is not; on the contrary, I propose that this connection contains the key to the contingency of man's being, which is otherwise absurd. Man's bond with God is that of love, the bond of one person with another person. This essay will attempt to sketch in broad strokes how a personalist interpretation of contingency might look, and what such an interpretation would mean for an understanding of the human person and of his vocation as person.

Contingency as Deficiency

The ontological poverty of man has not remained a bare theoretical notion throughout human history, but has plagued man's experience at the very core of his being. Blaise Pascal writes in the *Pensees*,

We sail within a vast sphere, ever drifting in uncertainty, driven from end to end. When we think to attach ourselves to any point and to fasten to it, it wavers and leaves us; and if we follow it, it eludes our grasp, slips past us, and vanishes for ever. Nothing stays for us...[W]e burn with desire to find solid ground and an

ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to the Infinite. But our whole groundwork cracks, and the earth opens to abysses.³¹⁰

Especially to recent and contemporary thinkers belongs the genius of having brought to relief this experience of contingency. Chief among them is Soren Kierkegaard, according to whom man lives in "fear and trembling unto death" before his nothingness, standing at every moment on the edge of the abyss where human consciousness ends and meets with the beyond which is not experienced. For Martin Heidegger, man's being is defined as a being-unto-death, his "life cast up between nothing and nothing, with death as its boundary and supreme possibility."³¹¹ Then there is Jean Paul Sartre's idea of "forlornness", an experience in which man realizes that he is alone, with nothing on which to depend, condemned to creating his world and his very self.³¹² The theologian Paul Tillich writes of "anxiety", as the "existential awareness of nonbeing," the "awareness that nonbeing is a part of one's own being."³¹³ According to Tillich, being at every moment is threatened by nonbeing.

If man's being is *identical* with his contingency in such a way that the contingency itself forms an absolute boundary to his being, then no matter what solutions are offered, they are not capable of affording man an exit out of his existential predicament: for insofar as they come from and remain *within* the horizon of his contingent condition they amount to an attempt of man to pick himself up by his metaphysical bootstraps.

There are thinkers who, despite the contradiction involved in such an idea, want to avoid this dependence of the world on another even while maintaining its contingency. This is the "absurdity" of Sartre, according to which contingency finds no external justification.³¹⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche also exemplifies this attitude. He posits the "eternal return"—that is, a world with a circular eternally-recurring movement. Such a world, closed in on itself in virtue of its circularity, is not in need of sustenance from without. Nietzsche writes, "He who does not believe in the circular process of the universe must pin his faith to an arbitrary God—thus my doctrine becomes necessary as opposed to all that has been said hitherto in matters of Theism."³¹⁵ There may be reasons to deny this dependence on another: as in the case of Nietzsche, one may want to avoid an absolute Other to whom one owes submission, an Other to whom one's freedom must bow.³¹⁶

And indeed, depending on how it is conceived, this dependence may be no consolation. Is it a dependence on Sartre's God—who threatens a small child of six in his innocent games?³¹⁷ Or is he like Nietzsche's God, who is indeed close to man—but so close, that he "cancels out" man's being in this suffocating closeness?³¹⁸ Understanding how horrifying such a dependence would be, both thinkers reject such a God.

Or perhaps the one on whom man depends is not evil and arbitrary. Perhaps he is simply, in Aristotle's language, a "self-thinking thought", an "unmoved mover." Would this be enough to relieve man's anxiety in the face of his relative non-being? Or would not such a dependence leave man cold?

But must contingency be viewed in this way? Is it in fact a dead end, the final word, the end of man's horizon—in short, a tragedy? The existentialist focuses on the aspect of contingency whereby a being *lacks* self-sufficiency, whereby a being is *deprived* of a metaphysical autonomy: man is *without* a ground within himself, he does *not* possess an existential grip on himself.

And in fact this insufficiency of man unto himself does constitute one aspect of contingency. But there is another element of contingency, as essential to it as the former: contingency—both logically, and as a metaphysical reality—stands in a necessary relationship to an *absolute*, as accounting for the being of what is contingent. The word is from the Latin "*contingere*", which in turn comes from *com-* "together" and *tangere* "to touch"; the absolute being is in a sustaining touch, as it were, with the being existing in a dependence on it.

If this is so, contingency is not closed in on itself, but by its very notion implies *transcendence*. There is a kind of paradox present here: the very *bounded-ness itself* of contingency brings with it a *bursting through* this boundary.³¹⁹

Alternative View of Contingency: Irenaeus and Bonaventure

In an exegesis by carried out by Irenaeus of Lyon of Christ's temptation by Satan in the desert, I believe that a different meaning of contingency emerges—one which has far-reaching implications for the understand of the being of the human person. I will leave aside the theological meaning of this text, and simply glean its metaphysical suggestion.

According to Irenaeus, Christ redeems man, conquering Satan and wresting man from his grip. In Book V of *Against Heresies*, Irenaeus considers how Adam falls: *By asserting his independence from God*. In the desert, Christ—"as the head of all things"³²⁰—teaches the human person how to enter into the salvation offered him. In each temptation, Satan attempts to lure Christ into what amounts to revealing his power as God, through overcoming the limitations of his human condition. Not only does Christ not succumb to this temptation: even more significantly, *he triumphs over Satan by the very act of entering into his condition as man*. In each temptation, writes Irenaeus, "by acknowledging his human nature He baffled His adversary."³²¹

In what, then, did this "humanity" consist, that it could overcome the devil? *In Christ's entering into a dependence on the Father*. In the temptations, Christ "...did not confound the adversary by the saying of any other, but by that

belonging to His own Father."³²² Contrary to what one might be led to think, Christ does not "grasp at his divinity", in the words of the letter to the Philippians, but *enters fully into his condition as man*. In other words, Christ comes to show man *what it means to be a creature*—and in this way, how to reverse the curse of Adam which had meant his death.

This idea leads us to begin consideration of a possible reinterpretation man's dependence on the Absolute Other: on these terms, perhaps it can now be understood as a dependence on One who first, *saves man*, and secondly, on One who therefore *stands in a benevolent relationship to the being whom he sustains*. In other words, we can say that according to Irenaeus, contingency emerges *not primarily as an insufficiency, but as the privilege of the creature to exist in an embrace of love with the one on whom he depends*.³²³

But this would seem to indicate that the origin of man's being is in *love*. Can an insight into this truth be gained philosophically? On the basis of examining the relations between the persons of the Trinity, Bonaventure—the 13th century mystic, theologian, and philosopher—produces an argument accessible to reason for the love-origin of creatures.

Following the Dionysian tradition, Bonaventure holds to the substantial goodness of God; but turning to the school of Richard of St. Victor, he understands the content of this goodness to be *love*—more specifically, he understands the Trinity as an exchange of love that constitutes the three persons of the Trinity in their personhood.³²⁴ For our purposes, significant here is that while the Son represents a substantial expression of the *intelligence* of God, the Spirit constitutes the substantial expression of the *will* of God. Bonaventure concludes to the following: the Son, as proceeding from the intellect of the Father, is a *necessary* procession, while the Spirit, as proceeding from the will, represents a *free* procession.³²⁵ But since seat of love is the will, for Bonaventure, freedom and love are intelligibly related: both love and freedom represent the *radical self-diffusivity* of God's being. Thus, the Spirit is this "superabundance" of God's goodness-as-love, *in personified being*; the mutual exchange of love between the Father and the Son, in its infinite character, results in the procession of a Person who is substantial love. According to Bonaventure, the Spirit fittingly receives also the name of "Gift."³²⁶ As such, the Spirit is then the *ratio donandi* of all gifts of the Trinity *ad extra*.³²⁷

From this, we can see that by strict metaphysical necessity, creation has its origin in love: for the fact that creatures are in no way necessary to a perfectly self-sufficient being, along with the manifest goodness of creation, *means that there could be no possible motive for this creation other than love*. Love *alone* accounts for gratuity.³²⁸ For Bonaventure, then, the absolute ontological condition of creation is not only the goodness of God, but the mystery of love subsisting in the Trinity.

Re-Interpreting Contingency in Light of the Personalist Character of Creation

But this reconsideration of contingency hints at another dimension, one which takes this reflection to yet another level—what I will refer to as a “personalist hermeneutic” for understanding contingency.³²⁹ In attempting to understand contingency, it is necessary to keep before us that the one who gives being is *Person*, and that the one who receives being is *also person*. In other words, it is necessary to approach the question of contingency according to the mode of being in which it is found, namely, the mode of *personhood*.

All of creation is in some sense a gift, as we have seen. But the genuine meaning of gift can be realized only in the realm of *personal existence*. While in some sense their own being is given to a tree or a cat, they are so only by a weak analogy. Properly speaking, only a person can be *given* something—*because only the person, among all other creatures, is capable of responding to the gift, by the act of receiving it*.

On this consideration, the act of creation can no longer be interpreted merely in terms of efficient causality: God the cause, man the effect. It cannot be understood as an act of “positing” man in being, much less can it be understood in terms of the Heideggerian notion of *Geworfenheit*—man as “chucked” arbitrary or “thrown” into existence.³³⁰ Rather, the human person, in being *person*, is an *addressee*, and a *recipient* of his being. In the words of Romano Guardini, one Person “calls” another into existence with the call of love.³³¹ Thus, the formal notion of contingency becomes *absorbed*, we could say, into a higher level of meaning: since man’s being is “bestowed” on him as an expression of love from a benevolent being, man’s dependency on the creator is *the dependency of a gift on a giver*. In creation, I have been *given* to myself as a *gift*. In virtue of this personalistic “modulation”, man’s relative non-being is no longer his enemy, but much rather a “gracious” bond that connects him to a benevolent Other, the glue of which is not “existence”, but “love.”³³²

The Consequent Vocation of the Human Person to Love

We have mentioned that the person is addressed in this way by the creator, because the person is the only being in creation that can *receive* the gift given to him. Thus, to be a human person means to have been addressed in love by another, whose love must be *received*. What, then, does it mean to receive a gift? Once again, we must think in personalist terms. Let us think of our every day experience. When a young man gives a gift to a woman who is not interested in him, what does she do? What is her instinctive response in this situation? *She declines the gift*. And why is that? Because she knows that in

receiving the gift, several things occur or are implied: first, in receiving a gift, a person receives not only the gift, but the one who gives it. Secondly, when one accepts a gift from another, one “owes” something to the other; in fact, just as in receiving the gift, the recipient receives the giver himself, so it also is that the recipient owes something of his very self to the giver. *In short, the gift is not truly received unless one gives oneself in return*. This is the very nature of a gift.³³³

From this emerges the meaning and end of the human person: if the foundation of man’s being is a call in love out of nothingness, a call which should resonate within man’s being and elicit from him a response in return, we discover that the human person is by its nature is *a being destined for communion in love*. The implication of the gift is the establishing of a relationship with a “Thou”, with another person. “To be” for man means “to be for and toward another.” We could say that the person’s being is essentially relational. What does this mean for the human person’s vocation? *To the extent that he receives himself from another, and gives himself to another, he is realized in his being as person. To live in relationship is the metaphysical norm of his being*. This means first and foremost in relation to the absolute Person, in relation to whom he is invited to live in a communion of love at the deepest level of his being. But secondarily, it means to live in a relation of love to *every person*. Every person is not only a gift to himself, but to every other person who encounters him. Each of us, therefore, is called to respond to the gift of others, by receiving them and making of himself a sincere gift in return.

It goes without saying that in the case of the human person, the realization of his being does not take place by a necessary unfolding through the dynamism of nature, as in the rest of creation, *but by a free decision*. Now, this means that while the person is *called* to live in relationship, *he may also refuse to do so*. The opposite of love, however, is not a simply refusal, but *extortion*. What does this extortion amount to? As we said, the person is given to himself by the creator, and as such, *truly belongs to himself*. But the critical question of *why* I have been given to myself is answered in a different way by the one who refuses to love than by the one who consents to live in love: the one who refuses love claims that I have been given to myself *so that I may keep myself for myself*. In this case, the person does not *receive* his being, but *appropriates it for himself*, and rather than giving himself away in love, appropriates others as well.

But just as the person lives and flourishes as person in consenting to live in love, *so conversely the one who refuses to do so wither and die in his being as person*.³³⁴ Paradoxically, in attempting to fill himself as the aim of his existence, the one who “extorts” his existence, and other persons, loses himself. In relating to the world in a self-centered way, the person becomes almost literally possessed by the things which he uses to fill himself. (This is why St.

Paul speaks of the *slavery* of sin.) In his *Metaphysics of Love*, Fredrick Wilhelmsen describes the self-defeating dynamic of the one who, rather than receiving his fulfillment by living for another, attempts to fill himself directly, by living for himself:

...the opposite of love is the attempt to appropriate the being of another to oneself...Experiencing himself as limited and finite, the unauthentic human being tries to make up the lack by gathering into his being the being of another. This is quite literally an act of metaphysical violation. If we scrutinize this act carefully, we discover that it involves a vicious contradiction.

Wilhelmsen goes on to explain this contradiction:

Hoping to make the being of another a being *for* himself...the unauthentic man ends by turning his own being into a *being-for-the-sake-of-the-appropriated*. Thus the miser begins by relating himself to money and ends by being defined by the very money he has appropriated: in a profound sense he has become little more than a being-for-money...the attempt to make another's being exclusively a being-for-me ends in my making my being a being-for-that-other...Ontological poverty is not overcome; it is simply accentuated. This poverty, in attempting to feed upon itself, accelerates the deterioration into nothingness it set out to conquer.³³⁵

Kierkegaard expresses in his inimitable way this contradictory dynamic of the self-centered existence of one who refuses to "give himself away"—and of its unedifying character to the community of those called to live in love: ["It is] a dismal sight to see someone who in a way is starving in abundance and who still has nothing at all left over for others. We say that it is a revolting sight; we are disgusted at his luxury; we shudder to think of self-indulgence's dreadful revenge—to starve in abundance..."³³⁶ *To starve in abundance*. This is indeed the "revenge" that selfishness takes on the selfish one—a retribution not carried out by an outside avenger, but one which is part of the internal dynamic of the rejection of transcendence, of the refusal to live for others.

The heart of the Gospel is not only something revealed by faith, not accessible to human reason, but a truth which bears itself out in the experience of man at almost every moment of his existence: "Truly, truly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit." (Jn. 12:24). "Whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life for my sake, will save it." (Lk. 9:24)

Conclusion

But now we have, in a way, come full circle. Man's condition can indeed be viewed as one of "ontological poverty." The human person can

choose to exclude himself from communal existence, he can opt to live for himself, and he can decide to refuse the gift of love. Or, alternatively, he can consent to enter into the benevolent metaphysical embrace of the One who is his ground, to give himself away in love to this One and to all who are offered to him as a gift—and thereby, receive himself back, immeasurably enriched and filled up to the full measure of his personhood.

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²⁹⁵ N.a. "MRI scans may have antidepressant effect: Study suggests electromagnetic fields can affect brain biology" <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7152050> (Accessed 3/10/2005).

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Benedict Carey, "Can Brain Scans see depression?" *New York Times* (October 18, 2005)

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/18/health/psychology/18imag.html?ex=1287288000&en=623b95b778748ffa&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss> (Accessed 2/15/2006).

²⁹⁸ R.A. Turner, M. Altemus, D. N. Yip, E. Kupferman, D. Fletcher, A. Bostrom, D. Lyons, & J. Amico, "Effects of positive and negative emotion on oxytocin, prolactin and ACTH in women," *Stress*, 5 (2002): 269-276.

²⁹⁹ T.R. Insel and L.E. Shapiro, "Oxytocin Receptor Distribution Reflects Social Organization in Monogamous and Polygamous Voles," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 89:5981-5985. <http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/89/13/5981> (Accessed 02/26/06).

³⁰⁰ M. Kosfeld, M. Heinrichs, P. J. Zak, U. Fischbacher, E. Fehr, "Oxytocin increases trust in humans," *Nature* 435 (2005): 673-676.

³⁰¹ P. Kirsch, C. Esslinger, Q. Chen, D. Mier, S. Lis, S. Siddhanti, H. Gruppe, V. S. Mattay, B. Gallhofer, A. Meyer-Lindenberg, "Oxytocin modulates neural circuitry for social cognition and fear in humans," *Journal of Neuroscience* 25 (2005): 11489-93.

³⁰² N.a. "Love Hurts Our Critical Faculties," *The Australian* (2/16/2005).

³⁰³ John Nash, "Truly, deeply, madly," *The Times* (6/4/2005).

³⁰⁴ Thomas Stuttaford, "What makes Cupid's arrows stick?" *The Times* 2/10/2006.

³⁰⁵ "Love Hurts Our Critical Faculty."

³⁰⁶ Nigel Hawkes, "Love means that you really do feel each other's pain," *The Times* (2/20/04).

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, trans. W. F. Trotter (New York: Dover, 2003), 72.

³¹¹ B.A.G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1955), 608.

³¹² "When we speak of forlornness, a term Heidegger was fond of, we mean only that God does not exist and that we have to face all the consequences of this..." (Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Human Emotions*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes [London: Routledge, 2001], 21.) Sartre, of course, takes contingency to a new level, in that the rejection of God is not inherent to the notion of contingency—quite the contrary, as we shall see.

³¹³ Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 35. In his *Systematic Theology*, he writes graphically, "In the anxiety of having to die nonbeing is experienced from 'the inside'." (Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967], 193.)

³¹⁴ Sartre recognizes that man did not create himself—but denies God's existence regardless of the metaphysical absurdity which this position entails. Sartre simply states that man is "thrown" into the world, without further explanation. (Cf. *Existentialism and Human Emotions*, 23.) This position—in which one is aware that "the world is not capable

of...being really self-subsistent" while at the same time refusing to "step to the idea that it is God who gives it meaning is not taken"—Guardini refers to as "autonomy of meaninglessness." (Romano Guardini, *The World and Person*, trans. Stella Lang [Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1939], 77.)

³¹⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Eternal Recurrence*, The Complete Works of Nietzsche, vol. 16, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), 16.

³¹⁶ Attributing it to Nietzsche, Guardini brilliantly connects (and even makes it depend on) this pride-driven theoretical resistance to the world's connection to an Absolute to a religious attitude: "The feeling of the preciousness of the finite, the death-daring defiance with which man risks this handful of existence, is also filled with religious energy...The comforting security of necessity is replaced by the glory of the venture. The feeling of the limitless depths of the world is replaced by that feeling in which finiteness, as soon as it is accepted with religious fervor, will send forth from itself a divinity of a new kind, finite divinity." This substitution "attempts something monstrous in the way of sacrilege and deceit" (*The World and Person*, 79-80). The Promethean gesture becomes complete when man not only rejects God, but replaces him with his own self.

³¹⁷ "Only once did I have the feeling that He existed. I had been playing with matches and burned a small rug. I was in the process of covering up my crime when suddenly God saw me. I felt His gaze inside my head and on my hands. I whirled about in the bathroom horribly visible, a live target. I blasphemed, I muttered like my grandfather, "God damn it, God damn it." He never looked at me again." (Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Words*, trans. Bernard Frechtman [New York: George Braziller, 1964], 102.)

³¹⁸ "Hah! hah! Thou art crawling close? / In such midnight – / What dost thou want? Speak! / Thou art crowding, pressing me – / Hah! Far too close! / Away! Away! / Thou are listening to me breathe, / Thou art listening to my heart..." (Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Penguin, 1982], 364-367.)

³¹⁹ Tillich is masterful in his existential analysis of contingency in its dimension of *insufficiency*, in its own inherent thrust toward non-being. I am reflecting on the other side of the coin of contingency, such that the point I make here is, in a sense, the reverse of the one which Tillich emphasizes: "...[T]he dialectical problem of nonbeing is inescapable. It is the problem of finitude. Finitude unites being with dialectical nonbeing. Man's finitude, or creatureliness, is unintelligible without the concept of dialectical nonbeing" (*Systematic Theology*, 189).

³²⁰ St. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Ante-Nicene Fathers (Vol. 1), eds. Alexander Roberts, D.D. and James Donaldson, LL.D. (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2004), V, 21.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid., V, 22.

³²³ In the words of Frederick Wilhelmsen, in contingency understood thus, the "tragedy" of man's relative nothingness meets the "ecstasy" of being bound to another in love (Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, *The Metaphysics of Love* [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962], 21.)

³²⁴ Zachary Hayes writes, "In analyzing the trinitarian dynamic as one of love, Bonaventure follows Richard of St. Victor in arguing that the three persons represent three modalities of love." (Kenan B. Osborne, OFM, ed., "Bonaventure, Mystery of the

Triune God." *The History of Franciscan Theology* [St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1994], 58.)

³²⁵ Within the Trinity, of course, freedom and necessity coincide without contradiction: the first procession of the Word is "an *emanatio per modum naturae, concomitante voluntate*", while the second is called by Bonaventure an "*emanatio per modum liberalitatis concomitante natura*." (Ibid.) Cf. also William Frank's analysis of freedom in God as transcending the ability to do otherwise (William Frank, "Duns Scotus' Concept of Willing Freely: What Divine Freedom Beyond Choice Teaches Us," *Franciscan Studies* 42 [1982], 68-89.)

³²⁶ I Sent. D. 18, a.u., q. 4, res (I, 328), as cited by Hayes in the introduction to the *Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity*, trans. Zachary Hayes, OFM (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2000), 61.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Only with such an understanding of contingency can one escape the conclusion at which Tillich arrives: that due to the lack of necessity concomitant with contingency, man is left to fate—which is terrifying not due to the determinism it implies, but due to its *arbitrariness*: "Yet it is not causal necessity that makes fate a matter of anxiety but the lack of ultimate necessity, the irrationality, the impenetrable darkness of fate" (*The Courage to Be*, 44-45). In *Systematic Theology* he writes that man is anxious because "the same contingency which has thrown man into existence may push him out of it" (196). If love is not at the source of contingent being, randomness or caprice are the only other alternatives.

³²⁹ The catalyst for my thoughts in this next section was John Paul II's analysis of creation as gift in his Wednesday audiences published as *The Theology of the Body*, the audiences of Dec. 19-Jan. 12 (See John Paul II, *The Theology of the Body* [Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1997], 54-66). In terms of sheer power, Tillich is correct in saying that only a God who is *almighty* provides the ontological ground the contingent being requires to exist. But I disagree when first, he seems to make power enough—even ontologically—to explain creation, and does not refer to the necessity of *goodness* and *love* as the ultimate security, and secondly, I take issue especially when he makes it enough from the *existential* point of view: "Faith in the almighty God is the answer to the quest for a courage which is sufficient to conquer the anxiety of finitude. Ultimate courage is based upon participation in the ultimate power of being" (*Systematic Theology*, 273). Wilhelmsen makes a similar critique in his *Metaphysics of Love*. In connection with this, it would be interesting to investigate his claim that Tillich's understanding of Protestantism is characterized by equating being with power, whereas the Catholic tradition has tended to equate being with love.

³³⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and Evanston: Harper Row, 1962), 174. This characteristic of Dasein's Being—this 'that it is'—is veiled in its 'whence' and 'whither', yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the '*thrownness*' of this entity into its 'there'; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the 'there'. The expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the *facticity of its being delivered over*." It is precisely the reduction of contingent to a *fact* which inspires terror in the human person.

³³¹ Guardini, *The World and Person*, 31-32.

³³² Given these considerations, I am not sure I agree with Tillich when he writes that anxiety—as the experience of contingency—is *inherent* to man's experience "quite apart from estrangement and sin" (*Systematic Theology*, 194-195). In other words, while being and nonbeing are equally constitutive of contingency as a *logical* concept, they are not so *in reality*, given the *real ontological foundation of man in love*. If the human person had not fallen, would he have perhaps always had access *in his experience* to the love-origin that gives his finitude an "infinite" security?

³³³ Cf. Marcel Mauss's study *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*, trans. W.D. Halls (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), which examines the gift-structure of ancient cultures. The giving of a gift established a bond between the giver and the recipient, since "...to make a gift of something to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself." The giving of the gift requires a corresponding receptiveness on the part of the donee (13), and imposes on the latter a solemn obligation to return the gift: "...by accepting [the gift] one knows that one is committing oneself. A gift is received 'with a burden attached'" (41).

³³⁴ With chilling mastery, Jean-Paul Sartre describes this stance of appropriation toward the world, and the implications of this for relations between persons as being doomed to either sadism or masochism (Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes [London: Routledge, 2001], 361-430). It is not surprising to find that for this same author, the being of man is "nothing."

³³⁵ Wilhelmsen, *The Metaphysics of Love*, 22.

³³⁶ Soren Kierkegaard, *Works of Love*, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 203.

³³⁷ See especially *Deus Caritas Est*, Part I, sec. 7 and the first sentence of sec. 8.

³³⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, XIII.3, 1156bff

³³⁹ Ibid., 1169b-7

³⁴⁰ Ibid., IX.4.

³⁴¹ That is, we desire to be holy as God is holy. Nevertheless, God remains absolutely superior to us in creating us, while He is uncreated.

³⁴² References to Wesley's works are cited internally.

³⁴³ Weber, 394-395.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 391ff.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., 399.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 349.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 342-344.

³⁴⁸ Theodore Jennings, *Good News to the Poor: John Wesley's Evangelical Economics* (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 1990), 108.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 218

³⁵⁰ Manfred Marquardt, *John Wesley's Social Ethics: Praxis and Principles*, trans. by John E. Steely and W. Stephen Gunter. (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 1992), 37.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 36 and 38.

³⁵² Randy L. Maddox, *Responsible Grace* (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood, 1994), 245.

³⁵³ For a list of authors who read Wesley as a proto-capitalist, see Maddox, 244, and endnote 91, 368.